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Abstract
The effect of financial  liberalization  on private saving  is theoretically  ambiguous,  not only
because the link between interest rate levels and saving is itself ambiguous, but also
because financial  liberalization  is a  multi-dimensional  and phased process, sometimes
involving  reversals. Some dimensions,  such as increased  household  access to consumer
credit or housing  finance,  might  also work to reduce  private savings  rather than increasing
them.  Furthermore, the  long-term effect  of  liberalization on  savings may  differ
substantially  from the impact  effect.
Using Principal Components, we construct a  25-year time series index of  financial
liberalization  for each of eight developing countries: Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia,  Mexico,  Turkey  and Zimbabwe.  This is employed  in an econometric  analysis  of
private  saving  in these countries.
We find that the pattern of effects differs across countries.  In summary,  liberalization
appears  to have  had a significant  positive  direct effect  on saving  in Ghana  and Turkey,  and
a  negative effect in Korea and Mexico.  No  clear effect is discernible  in  the other
countries.  There  is no evidence  of significant,  positive  and sizeable  interest  rate effects.
For the present, our results must be taken as an indication  that there is no firm evidence
that financial liberalization  will increase saving.  Indeed, under some circumstances,
liberalization  has been  associated  with a fall  in saving. All  in all, it would  be unwise  to rely
on an increase  in private savings  as the channel  through which  financial  liberalization  can
be expected  to increase  growth.
1I. Introduction
A wave of liberalization  of financial markets has swept over much of the developing  world,
especially  since  the mid-1980s. This liberalization  has been characterized  by greater scope being
granted  to market  forces in determining  interest  rates and in allocating  credit (Caprio, Atiyas and
Hanson 1994).  Although  this has occurred under the pressure of increased globalization  of
financial markets, and following  the example of many industrial countries, there has been an
expectation  that financial  liberalization  would  help economic  development.  In particular,  the early
literature on financial repression,  following  McKinnon  (1973) and Shaw (1973), stressed the
potential  role  of higher  interest  rates in mobilizing  savings  that could  be put to productive  use.
But it is far from clear that financial  liberalization  actually  does increase  private savings. One
obvious and important consideration  is that the effect of interest rates on  savings is  itself
amnbiguous,  as the income  effect  might  offset substitution  effects. In addition,  one must recognize
that financial  liberalization  involves  more  than  just a change  in interest  rates. Other dimensions  of
financial  liberalization,  such as increased  household  access  to consumer  credit or housing  finance,
might also work to reduce private savings  rather than increasing  them (Muellbauer  and Murphy,
1990,  Jappelli  and Pagano, 1994).'  Furthermore,  the long-term  effect  of liberalization  on savings
may differ substantially  from the inpact effect. Lastly, financial  liberalization  is a process rather
than a one-shot  event.
The purpose  of this paper is to provide  an empirical  examination  of the total effect of the financial
reform  on aggregate  private savings  based on eight case studies:  Chile, Ghana, Indonesia,  Korea,
Malaysia,  Mexico,  Turkey and Zimbabwe. These  countries  have all significantly  liberalized  their
financial  sector policies, but they differ in the nature and phasing of financial  liberalization,  in
other aspects of their policy reform program, and in  the macroeconomic  context in  which
liberalization  took place.  This variety allows us to explore the degree to which the savings
response  differs  from country  to country,  as well  as to test whether  the response  is a common  one.
There is also the view, stressed  in the neo-structuralist  contributions  of Taylor  (1983)  and Van
Wijnbergen  (1982)  that the effect  of reduced  taxation  on formal  financial  intermediaries  might
actually  reduce  the flow of credit to the private  sector  to the extent  that reserve  requirements
captured  funds  for the  government  that  had  been  substituted  away  from  the  curb  market.
2Financial  reform  typically  comprises  several  key phases, often  separated  by several  years. Reform
measures  are introduced  in a number  of different  dimensions:  interest  rates, credit allocation,  bank
ownership,  prudential  regulation,  security  markets  and openness  of the capital  account. There  have
been  frequent  debates  as to the best sequencing  of these various  elements. In practice,  reforn has
not been a monotonic  process:  in some  cases there have  been setbacks  involving  temporary  policy
reversals.
A thorough quantitative  assessment  of the impact of such a process must take account of its
gradual  and reversible  nature. Based  on an analysis  of the historical  evolution  in each case we have
identified  the timing of major moves on eight different dimensions  towards a more liberalized
system.  Using the principal components  of the resulting matrices  of zero-one variables (ones
correspond  to the years after a particular reform  is introduced)  we obtain a continuous  financial
liberalization  index for each of our countries. Our data extends over a quarter of a century, a
period long enough  to allow us to model  the dynamic  response  to liberalization  in each country
separately.
Visual inspection  of the time series of the main relevant variables - the financial liberalization
index, the real interest rate, monetary depth (either M2 or total credit to the private sector
expressed  as a percentage  of GNDI) and the private savings  ratio - reveals little evidence  of a
clear-cut  relationship  between  saving  and liberalization.
We estimate  an econometric  relationship  expressing  the private saving ratio as a function of the
real interest rate and the index of financial  liberalization,  along with income, inflation  and the
savings  of the public  sector. In addition  to directly  measuring  the contribution  of liberalization  to
the volume  of aggregate  savings,  our procedure  improves  on earlier  estimates  of the saving-interest
relation,  which omitted  any role for financial  sector liberalization  other than the real interest rate
channel.
Although  they cannot  be solved-out  for a net effect on the level  of savings,  Euler equations  can be
helpful in detecting  the extent of credit rationing.  In this spirit we also assess the impact of
financial  reform  on the extent of liquidity  constraints  by estimating  an augmented  Euler equation
for consumption,  in which it is assumed  (in an extension  of the model  of Campbell  and Mankiw,
31989, 1991)  that the fraction of the consumers  are liquidity  constrained  varies with the degree  of
financial  liberalization.
The structure  of the paper is as follows. Section  II describes  the main channels  through which
financial  liberalization  may affect savings and briefly reviews  the relevant empirical literature.
Section  III describes  the financial  reform  process  as it occurred  in each  of the eight countries  being
studied here.  This section also explains and graphs our index of financial liberalization  and
provides  summary  statistics  and bivariate  correlations  with financial  depth and savings. Sections
IV and V present  the econometric  results based on the saving  function  and on the augmented  Euler
equation  for consumption,  respectively.  Section VI concludes.
II.  Financial Liberalization and  Savines: Theoretical Back2round and  Review of  the
Empirical Evidence
Although financial liberalization  can enhance the efficiency with which saved resources are
channeled  into productive  use, the effect  on the quantity  of savings  is theoretically  ambiguous. 2
The mechanisms  at work here include  both long-term  and short-term  effects. Once it has settled
down, a  competitive  liberalized  financial system will typically be characterized  by improved
savings  opportunities,  including  higher  deposit  interest  rates, a wider range  of savings  media  with
improved  risk-return  characteristics,  and in many  cases more  banks and bank branches,  as well as
other  financial  intermediaries. Bank lending  rates  will  typically  be higher  for those borrowers  who
had privileged  access in the restricted  regime, but access to borrowing  should be wider.  These
long-term  effects  of liberalization  on aggregate  private saving  will be felt through changes  in rates
of return and in the degree  of credit restrictions.  Moreover,  if  financial  liberalization  also has a
2  It should  be stressed  at the outset  that our evidence  is based  chiefly  on national  accounts  definitions  of
saving.  These  need  to be distinguished  from  intennediated  saving  or  from  capital  flows.  Dornbusch
and Reynoso  (1989)  observe  that capital  flight through  mis-invoicing  of trade serves  to conceal
saving  that is being  hidden  abroad:  an apparent  increase  in saving  may  really  be a reduction  in
capital  flight.  Furthermore,  they note that, as durable  goods  purchases  are usually  treated  as
consumption  in the data, a shift from these to accumulation  of financial  assets tends to be
misleadingly  recorded  as saving.
4favorable effect on the allocation of resources this will generate increases in income that will, in
turn, increase savings. 3
The process of financial liberalization also unleashes a series of short run effects.  Not only can the
process  of domestic portfolio adjustment lead to transitory  changes in the volume  of domestic
saving, but (especially when combined with liberalization of the foreign exchange market) it may
also induce large capital inflows, largely but not exclusively attributable to a return flow of past
flight capital.  If not sterilized, such inflows can result in a credit boom leading to real income
surges, which in turn have a direct, but transitory, effect on the volume of saving.  Modeling of the
effect of financial liberalization on saving needs to take account of these short run effects, as well
as the long-run effect.  It is also important to recognize that some of the overall effects can come
through the effect of income on saving.
11.  1 Steady  State Effects
If financial liberalization improves the  rate of return for savers, then knowledge of the interest
elasticity of saving can help predict the long-term impact of liberalization  on saving.  However,
because  of the wealth  and  current  income effects that  will generally  be  present,  there  is  no
presumption as to the direction of the aggregate saving response to  an exogenous interest rate
change.  Despite many studies, this remains an empirically controversial area - partly because of a
surprising shortage of reliable and comparable cross-country data on retail interest rates.  Recent
reviews by Balassa (1990), Srinivasan (1993), and Fry (1995) conclude that more studies have
found  a  positive  interest elasticity  of savings  than  a  negative one,  but  the  coefficients have
generally been small and often insignificant. 4
3  It should be noted that increased  household  borrowing  may not all go to consumption  or housing. A
relaxation of borrowing constraints could promote human capital formation, though this will
normally  be measured  as consumption  in the National  Accounts.
4 The effect  of interest rates on saving  could be non-linear,  perhaps  involving  threshold  effects.  Reynoso
(1989) presents  some  evidence  that the response  of savings  to the interest  rate may  be represented  by
a parabola,  with  savings  increasing  most significantly  when interest rates go from sharply  negative
to  just below  zero, then leveling  off, and finally  declining  as real interest rates  become  very  large and
positive,  in which  case they may reflect  political  uncertainty,  peso-effects,  bank insolvency,  and the
like. Interestingly,  Levine  (1994)  finds that the greatest  improvement  in growth  comes  from
elininating significantly  negative  real interest  rates,  with small gains to further increases.
5Possibly  of greater  importance for  aggregate  saving may  be  the  availability  of  a  variety  of
alternative non-financial assets, the return on which may not be captured by deposit interest rates.
While the use of real interest rates implicitly acknowledges that goods inventories are an alternative
to  financial assets,  in principle it would be very useful  to take explicit  account of alternative
investment opportunities,  notably the  rate of return on  owner-occupied housing  and  other real
estate investment.  Many developing countries have experienced property booms, and household
saving may have been very sensitive to the after-tax rate of return on investment in real estate (see
for example, Koskela and Viren, 1994).  Unfortunately, in most cases data on such rates of return
are not available for developing countries.
Published interest rates may not reflect capital market realities if households and small enterprises
are constrained from borrowing what they would wish because of financial repression or for other
reasons.  To the extent that liberalization reduces these borrowing constraints, saving ratios could
be lowered (Jappelli and Pagano (1989), (1994)). There are two mechanisms at work here. First,
when the borrowing constraint binds, it induces the individual to consume less. Second, even when
the constraints are not binding in the current period, the  expectation that they may  bind in the
future reduces today's  consumption.
A very large literature, in response to Hall's (1978) original contribution, has attempted to gauge
the  importance of  borrowing  constraints  by  inferring that  any  dependence of  the  change  in
consumption  on  income might  reflect the  inability of households to  smooth the  intertemporal
pattem  of their consumption through borrowing (see for instance, Campbell and Mankiw,  1989,
1991; Zeldes, 1989).5 The developing country literature here generally confirms thc importance of
such dependence - with some indication that it has been higher for developing countrics (see for
instance, Rossi, 1988, Haque and Montiel, 1989, Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991).
11.2 Transitional effects of liberalization
The impact effect of financial liberalization on saving could be larger than the sustaincd long-tcrrn
effect.  This is because households will be able to revise target precautionary balances, allowing
5 The household's  inability  to borrow  at wholesale  markiet  interest  rates  may  be a rationing  phenomenon,  or it
may  reflect  a large  wedge  between  retail  deposit  and borrowing  rates  (e.g.  money-lender  rates). A lower
wedge  would  reduce  saving,  as King (1986)  found  for the UK  See  also Alessie,  Devereux,  and Weber
(1993)  for  an analysis  of  the effects  of abolition  of credit  controls  on the demnand  for  cars  in the U.K.
6for  example some middle-aged households that  had  hitherto been  constrained  from  life-cycle
borrowing to consume at a higher rate than they would have over a full-lifetime of unconstrained
access to borrowing.  These transitional effects suggest that aggregate household saving could dip
below its steady state level, and that a surge in consumption may be observed (Muellbauer, 1994).
Moreover, as noted above, financial liberalization has been accompanied by real estate booms in
some countries; the resulting increase in real wealth also may have a temporarily negative impact
6 on saving.
The large  capital inflows  that  have  been associated with  recent liberalizations have  also  had
complex short-term macroeconomic consequences. Liberalization of the domestic financial system
has typically been only one element of a package of reforms that have been associated with these
inflows, and the inflows have proved to be easily reversible.  The impact on saving comes through
the associated changes in availability and cost of credit, revised expectations of income growth,
and increases in financial wealth, especially due to upward movements in property prices.  All this
may lead to consumption booms and to a fall in the saving rate.
11.3  Quantifying the effects offinancial  liberalization on saving
Most  empirical  examinations of  the  effects of  financial  liberalization  or,  more generally,  of
financial  development on  saving have  involved adding  one  or  more  variables  to  established
econometric specifications either of saving or of the rate of change in consumption.  The simplest
specifications identify pre-  and  post-  liberalization periods with  a  dummny  variable  (an  early
example is de Melo and Tybout,  1986, for Uruguay); an alternative is to specify a  linear trend
reflecting gradual liberalization (Muellbauer and Murphy, 1993 for the UK).
Others have employed such proxy variables as the volume of consumer credit (e.g. Jappelli and
Pagano 1989, 1994).  Ostry and Levy  (1995) used this variable both on its own and in interaction
with an interest rate, and concluded that liberalization had not only lowered saving in France, but
6 Financial  liberalization  could  affect  the value of human and non-human  wealth in a variety  of ways. An
increase in  the value of non-human wealth will normally, ceteris paribus, reduce saving as
consumption  out of income can now be permanently  higher.  However,  it is hard to isolate such
wealth effects on saving of financial liberalization,  not only because  of the difficulty  of measuring
human and nonhuman wealth, but also because other reforms affecting wealth are usually being
undertaken  at the same  time.
7had transformed a negative association between saving and interest rates into a positive one (cf
Bayoumi, 1993 for the UK). An easing of credit market conditions facing households was also
detected for the  1980s in  Scandinavian countries by  Koskela  et  al.  (1992),  and  Lehmussaari
(1990).  Here the effect on savings came indirectly through the impact of increased housing finance
on house prices.
In their 30-country study, Jappelli and Pagano (1994) also found another type of credit availability
variable to be highly significant, namely the normal loan-to-value ratio obtainable from mortgage
finance institutions: a  15 percentage point increase in the loan-to-value ratio reducing the national
savings rate by 2.6 percentage points.  This substantial effect may not be entirely housing-related,
as the variable may be capturing movements in wider credit availability.
Other proxy  measures of the prevalence of credit constraints  that  have been  used include the
percentage  of  home-owners in  certain  age-groups, the  interest  rate  wedge  on  consumer  and
mortgage  loans  (Jappelli  and  Pagano,  1989),  and  the  rate  of  consumer  credit  delinquencies
(Carroll, 1992). Confirming the evidence for industrial countries, Vaidyanathan (1993) shows that
international  variations  in  the  sensitivity of  consumption to  income are  positively  related  to
financial depth (measured by the ratio of M2 to GDP), suggesting again the importance of liquidity
constraints.
More  directly, Miles (1992)  estimated that  80  per  cent  of  the total  amount  of  home equity
withdrawn by UK households each year in the 1980s was consumed (rather than involving just  a
portfolio shift), accounting for essentially all of the collapse in the UK personal savings ratio from
12 per cent to less than 5 per cent.
The existence of well-functioning stock markets  could also  be a  factor  influencing saving  by
offering an improved risk-return frontier while retaining liquidity.  But again, the predicted impact
on aggregate saving is theoretically ambiguous and recent empirical evidence suggests that funds
8attacted  to liquid stock markets in developing  countries come mainly as a switch from other
assets'
III.  Financial  Reform: Measurement and Effects
Ill.l Financial  repression  and the  process of reform
The multifaceted  nature of financial  reform  -- involving  deregulation,  liberalization,  globalization,
privatization  --  complicates  the measurement  of its effects. In addition,  the reforms  undertaken  in
each country have reflected  the perceived  problems of the pre-reform environment. Prior to
reform,  most countries  experienced  a period  of mild  or severe  financial  repression:  intervention  by
governments  in allocating  and pricing  credit,  controlling  what banks and other  intermediaries  could
do, using  intermediaries  as tax collection  devices,  and often  limiting  competition,  in particular  from
foreign institutions.  These interventions  varied by country, and in  some countries included
government  ownership  of banks as a very direct  way of influencing  how  they did business. 8
In developing  countries,  interventi3n  in the financial  sector went considerably  further than the
regulation  of interest  rates and of credit  expansion  that characterized  industrial  country  policy. In
some countries  banks were required  to hold as much  as one-half  or more of their liabilities  in the
form of reserve  or liquid  assets (often  deposits  at the central  bank) and another  large part of the
portfolio  was dominated  by directed  credit. Although  the latter  might  have been  structured  so as to
leave significant  discretion  to the banks for credit assessment  and monitoring  (as in Japan), in
practice  in many cases little power or responsibility  was left to the banks. 9 In such cases, with
most of their balance sheet effectively  out of their own control, banks invested little in credit
assessment,  monitoring,  or asset-liability  skills, and in the extreme cases -- formerly socialist
7Levine  and  Zervos,  1996;  see  also  Bonser-Neal  and  Dewenter,  1996. This  conclusion  was  drawn  from
the insignificance  of  indicators  of stock  market  development  in cross-section  regressions  where  the
dependent  variable  was  the  ratio  of  private  saving  to GDP.
8  In addition  to concerns  about an inherent instability  of finance, these interventions  were often
rationalized  by a view  that finance  was not decisive  for growth  unless  harnessed  by a benevolent
planner.  Levine  (1997)  discusses  some  of the historical  context  and developments  of attitudes  about
the financial  system.  and Caprio,  Atiyas,  and Hanson  (1994)  describe  financial  reforms  in Chile,
Malaysia,  Indonesia,  Korea,  Turkey,  and  New  Zealand.  See  also  Caprio  and  Klingebiel  (1996).
9 In some  cases,  the  small  size  of  the economy  meant  that a government  requirement  to provide  financial
support  for a sector  such  as steel-making  meant  in practice  lending  to a single  steel  company,  with
the result  that  the  banks  viewed  the risk  as  belonging  to the authorities.
9economies  -- the result was a low skill base in finance  and little  of the infrastructure  that supports
market-based  financial  intermediaries.'°
Beginning  in many countries  in the 1970s  and accelerating  subsequently,  governments  began to
reconsider  more direct interventions,  and financial reform programs have included attempts to
reduce or re-direct  the government's  role, most noticeably  in the area of pricing and directing
credit. The path of refonns  often  was influenced  both by government  views,  initial  conditions,  and
political pressures for reform. For example in Chile, real interest rates had been negative  for
decades  prior to the removal  of controls  in 1974,  and this de-control  was quite sudden. In contrast,
following  mild repression  in the 1960s,  Malaysian  authorities  in early 1973 -- like their Japanese
counterparts  much  later -- began  deregulating  some  longer  term interest  deposit  rates but let several
years pass before  all controls  were removed.  A very gradual  process  also characterized  the Korean
experience.  At times, the process was rather bumpy with re-imposition  of controls  after an initial
bout of liberalization,  as in  Chile and Malaysia. Often the re-imposition  of controls was a
consequence  of a severe  banking  crisis that developed  in an unstable  macro context,  characterized
by large  capital inflows, and excessive  risk taking  in the absence  of effective  prudential  regulation,
as in Chile  in the early 1980s.
Reforms in general include two parts: outright de-regulation,  limiting the government's  direct
intervention,  and putting  in its place a system  of prudential  regulation  aimed  at ensuring  the safety
and soundness  of banking.  In addition  there is an institution-building  component.  The latter likely
is a key component  of the reform  process: during periods of substantial intervention,  especially
where most risk is born by government,  the demand for financial  infrastructure  -- accounting,
auditing,  legal systems,  and other  finance-related  skills -- is quite  limited. When  this intervention  is
lessened,  and if the incentive  structure  is right, intermediaries  start devoting  more  resources  to risk
and credit analysis,  for example,  and spend  more  to upgrade  the quality  of their staff.
III2  Measuring  financial reform
1  See  Caprio  and Claessens  (1997)  for a discussion  of initial  conditions  in reforming  financial  systems.
They  argue  that long periods  of financial  repression  greatly  weakened  the skills, incentives,  and
infrastnrcture  in finance  and therefore  complicated  the  reform  process.
10The ideal index of financial reform would attempt to measure both the de-regulatory  and the
institution  building  aspects  of the process.  Unfortunately,  short of using outcome  measures  such
as the development  of markets as a proxy - an approach leading in the present context to
unacceptable  endogeneity  difficulties  -- it seems impossible  at present  to find useful measures  of
institutional  development.  For these reasons  we have chosen to build our index of reform from
explicit  policy  changes  which,  though  not wholly  independent  of wider  economic  conditions,  should
be less subject  to endogeneity  problems.
Our index  thus summarizes  exogenous  changes  in interest rate regulation,  reserve requirements,
directed  credit, bank ownership  (moves  toward privatization),  liberalization  of securities  markets,
prudential regulation,  and intemational  financial liberalization. Based on an analysis of the
historical evolution in each case we have identified  the timing of major moves towards, and
sometimes  away from, a more liberalized  system  under each of these headings  (Appendix  1 gives
the details). This yields  a matrix  of zero-one  variables  for each country. Rather than attempting  to
use all of these  variables  in the econometrics  -- that would  use up too many  of the available  degrees
of freedom  -- we have constructed  for each country  the principal  components  of the matrix. We
use the first principal  component  as our main liberalization  index in the regressions  of Section  IV
below.  (As an alternative,  we also experiment  below with a  weighted  average of the more
important principal components,  using as weights the fraction of the total standard deviation
explained  by each component.)  In all cases, a higher  value  of the index  in a given  year captures  an
overall  more  market  oriented  regime."
The resulting  index  is shown  in Figures  1-8, with data on financial  depth  (M2 or total credit  to the
private sector as a percentage  of Gross National Disposable  Income,  GNDI), real interest rates,
and the private saving rate (measured  as a share of GNDI). We have used a definition  of the
private saving rate, both unadjusted  and adjusted  for capital losses due to inflation  on domestic
assets denominated  in local currency. For example  in Figure la, the index  (both versions)  captures
the partial  reversal  of reforms  in Chile  resulting  from the twin bankdng  and debt crises of 1982.12
See also Demetriades  and Luintel  (1997)  for an application  to India of the principal  components
approach  to aggregating  the information  contained  in a combination  of policy  changes  and outcome
variables.
12 The  Chilean  reforms  had  begun  in 1974  with  the  freeing  of interest  rates  and  the  beginning  of  the
easing  of reserve  requirements,  and continued  in the mid-  and  late-1970s  with  bank  privatization
11Likewise,  Figure 5a clearly  charts  the fact that de-control  was initially  short-lived  in Malaysia  (see
Figure 5a), in part because  banks were observed  to be slow  to reduce  rates as their cost of funds
declined,  but also because a moderately  severe  banking crisis led Malaysian authorities  to re-
impose  interest  rate controls  for several  years in the mid-1980s.' 3
Significant  but different  reforms  were introduced  in all of the countries  under review. As seen in
the data for Chile and Malaysia,  reform  can see significant  reversals,  and more generally  is not a
linear  process,  but proceeds  in fits and starts.
1113 Visual  evidence  on savings and reform
The  figures provide  no visual  evidence  of a clear positive  association  between  either  index (or real
interest rates) and private saving for most countries. This is also confirmed by the bivariate
correlation  coefficient  between  saving  and the index  (contemporaneous  or lagged)  reported  in Table
1, which is positive  and significant  only for Turkey  and Korea. For some  periods and in some of
the countries  there appears to be a negative  relationship  between saving and the index.  For
instance, saving plummets in Chile (Figure la  and Id) with the onset of reform -- perhaps
reflecting  the easing of credit constraints --  then recovers  gradually until a more significant
increase  starting  in 1985,  associated  in part with the introduction  of a fully  funded  pension  system.
In Mexico (Figures 6a and 6d), we observe a protracted decline  in the savings since reforms
began.' 4 A lack of correlation  between  the index  of financial  reform  and savings  is evident  in the
cases of Ghana (Figures  2a and 2d) and Zimbabwe  (Figures 8a and 8d), where savings  first rose
then fell, while  the index  was registering  continuing  gains.' 5 In Malaysia, savings  did rise in the
1970s  as reforns began,  but then leveled  off and fell back to their original  level subsequently.  In
and the  raising  of ceilings  on  foreign  borrowing.  After  the  reversals  of 1982,  liberalization  resumed
in 1986.
13  Caprio,  Atiyas,  and Hanson  (1994)  describe  financial  reforms  in Chile,  Malaysia,  Indonesia,  Korea,
Turkey,  and New  Zealand.  See  also Caprio  and Klingebiel  (1996,  1996a)  for a further  discussion  of
the  Malaysian  experience.
14 The  sharp  drop  in the adjusted  series  in 1988  is due  to a large  increase  in the  measured  stock  of  debt  tD
which  the adjustment  applies  in that  year.
15 Albeit  with  continued  negative  interest  rates. The  persistence  of negative  real  interest  rates,  notably  in
the cases  of Ghana  and Zimbabwe,  after  the onset  of reform  measures  calls  into question  how  real
reforms  have  been. Even  though  interest  rates  were  deregulated,  in some  countries  they  continue  to
be controlled  by  a cartel  of  banks,  often  at the  informnal  behest  of  the  authorities.
12contrast, there is a clearer  positive  association  between  the index  and saving in Korea (Figures  4a
and 4d), particularly until the late 1980s, Turkey (Figures 7a and 7d), and to a lesser extent
Indonesia,  where, however, part of the increase in savings occurred  before domestic financial
reforns began  ( see Figures  3a and 3d).
It is noteworthy  that the figures  and bivariate  correlation  suggest  a closer  association  between  the
behavior of the index and measures of financial depth for a  majority of the countries. The
exceptions  are Turkey, Ghana and Zirnbabwe. There also appears to be a  generally  positive
association  between  our index  and real interest  rates, which  is statistically  significant  in half of the
countries.
IV. Econometric Evidence:  Savin2s  Functions
We begin by estimating  the long run and short run  relationship  between savings and its
determinants  separately  for each country  over the period 1970-1994. .6  In the basic specification,
the (unadjusted)  private saving rate sly, is modeled  as a function of the natural log of real per
capita GNDI  In y,, the real interest  rate r, our index  of financial  liberalizationfli,,  the inflation  rate
01,, and the government  saving rate, govs.17  The choice  of variables included  in the equation  is
limited  partly by series  availability  and partly by the length  of the sample  period.  In particular  we
would  like to have  included  a satisfactory  proxy for non-human  wealth,  but available  ones, such  as
the stock of high-powered  money or government  debt, are more likely to be misleading  than
helpful.
We have  tested the order of integration  of the variables  both country  by country,  using the ADF
test, and by panel,  using  the Im, Pesaran and Shin (1996)  test. The results of the tests suggest  that
we cannot  reject  the hypothesis  that s/yt, In yt,  flit,  and  govst are integrated  of order one (see Table
2, Part I for the panel tests; the country  by country  ADF tests are not reported for reasons of
16 Except  for  slightly  shorter  samples  for: Indonesia  (1971-1994),  Korea  (1970-1993),  and  Zimbabwe
(1974-1993).
'7  Gross  national  disposable  income  is used  as a proxy  for income.  The real interest  rate is defined  as a
short  term rate (continuously  compounded)  minus  the inflation  rate (calculated  as the forward  log
difference).  The  conclusions  reached  below  are not  sensitive  to the  definition  of  the real  interest  rate
and of  the inflation  rate.  See  the data appendix  for further  details  on variable  constructions  and on
the data  sources.
13space).  However for some countries there is evidence against the unit root hypothesis for rt and E,.
For instance, when a trend is included, the hypothesis that r, has a unit root is rejected at the 5%
significance level in  Malaysia,  Korea  and  Indonesia. Also,  a  unit  root  in  O,  is  rejected for
Malaysia, Indonesia and Turkey.  The panel test suggests the rejection of the unit root hypothesis
for both variables.
Using the Dickey Fuller (DF) or the Adjusted Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests on the residuals of the
cointegrating regressions, country by country, and the critical values calculated as suggested by
MacKinnon (1990) to adjust for sample size, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no cointegration
between the vector of variables mentioned above (including or excluding the real interest rate and
inflation). These cointegration tests must be treated with a healthy dose of caution both because of
the lowv  power of such tests against reasonable alternatives and because of the small number of
observations available relative to the number of variables.  As shown in Table 2, Part II, however,
the panel cointegration test proposed by Pedroni (1997a, b), and  the Lin, Pesaran and  Shin test
applied  to  the  residuals  of  the  cointegrating  vector  are  consistent  with  the  existence  of  a
cointegrating relationship between slyt, In y,, flit, and govs,  (or between sy,t, In y,, flit, govs,, r,, and
Dt, if the troublesome unit root tests on the last two variables are disregarded).
In Table 3 we present two estimates of the cointegrating vector, when r,, and Q, are included. The
estimates of Part I are OLS.  Since the conventional OLS standard errors are not valid in this
context, Part  II shows approximate GLS  estimates obtained by  including the  contemporaneous
differences of the right hand side variables as additional regressors and allowing for an AR(1) error
term.,"  The main drawback of the Dynamic GLS estimates is the small number of degrees of
freedom available, so that it is probably wise to consider both sets of result.  Because the estimates
of the coefficients of r,, and 0, are problematic if those variables are truly stationary, and although
their inclusion does not invalidate the consistency for the coefficients (and associated inference) for
the other non- stationary variables, we also report (Part III) Dynamic GLS estimates when rt, and
°t  are both excluded.
18  Ideally  one would  have  wanted  to include  additional  leads  and lags of the differences,  however  the
length  of our sample  precludes  us from doing that. Our procedure  can be seen as an approximation
to the DGLS  procedure  in Stock  and Watson  (1993).
14In order to assess also the short run effects of liberalization, Table 4 reports an estimated error
correction  model for saving.19 The reported estimates are OLS; unreported GMM estimates lead
to the same conclusions conceming the effect offli, and r,.
Despite the  fact  that  we  have  here  corrected  the  omission of  other  dimensions of  financial
liberalization, there is -- except for the OLS estimate for Mexico -- no evidence from the country-
by-country estimates of a significant distinct positive effect of the real interest rate on savings.  In
most cases the long run point relationship is negative, and significantly so in the case of Ghana and
Indonesia.  The evidence based  on the time series for  individual developing countries confirms,
therefore, the general conclusion derived from previous  studies using  pooled time  series-cross
country data that it is not possible to pin down a systematic positive effect of increases in the
interest rate on savings.
So far as the effect of financial liberalization itself is concerned, the picture is mixed.  For Korea
and Mexico (and Zimbabwe when rt, and O] are excluded) the coefficient of the index of financial
liberalization is negative and significant in the long run (using the Dynamic GLS estimates).  For
Korea, there is also evidence of a  significant negative short run effect.  On the other hand, for
Turkey and Ghana (only Turkey, when r,, and  O, are excluded) there is evidence of a positive and
significant long-run effect. 20
The estimated impacts of the index on private savings are sizable; for example, the results of Table
3 Part II imply that liberalization in Korea and Mexico has permanently lowered savings by  12%
and 6% of GNDI respectively.  On the other hand we estimnate  that  liberalization has raised the
savings rate in Turkey by 13% and in Ghana by 6%.
So far as the other variables are concerned, the income variable is significant in most cases (both in
the long and short run).  The sign of the coefficient of the inflation rate differs across countries -
19  rt and ort  are included  in the cointegrating  vector.
20  Note that these are also  the two countries  whereflit is uncorrelated  with private  credit, suggesting  that
borrowing  constraints may  not have  been much eased.
15significantly  negative in Ghana,  indonesia  and Malaysia; significantly  positive in  Mexico. 21
Finally, there is evidence  that an increase in government  savings leads to a decrease  in private
savings. Actually  for Korea, Malaysia  and Mexico  (and, depending  upon  the specification,  Chile
and Zimbabwe)  the estimates  are consistent  with Ricardian  equivalence,  in that the coefficient  of
govs, is not significantly  different  from minus  one.
If the coefficients  are truly the same  across  countries,  then  a more  efficient  estimate  can be
obtained  by imposing  that restriction  and estimnating  the cointegrating  vector  by the SURE  method.
The drawback may be that one may be imposing invalid restrictions, because of differences
in preferences,institutional settings and nature of the liberalization.
Moreover, the construction of the index does not guarantee comparability of scale across
countries. Table 5 shows  the results  of this approach:  the regression  of column  (1) includes  only
the levels of the explanatory variables, while the regression of column (2) also included their first
difference  and an AR(1)  error. (The  estimated  coefficients  on these  dynamic  terms were  not
restricted and are not reported.)
These  constrained  SUTRE  estimates  imply  that the real interest rate has a significant  positive  effect
and financial liberalization a significant negative effect on saving.  However, the likelihood ratio
test suggests  that the assumed  equality  of coefficients  can be rejected  at conventional  significance
levels,  which implies  that imposing  equality  across countries  is inappropriate. If that problem  can
be finessed by taking the constrained estimates to be some form of 'typical'  response then we find
that combining  the interest rate and index effects,  the typical financial  liberalization  would have
lowered saving.  For instance, using the results in column (2), the predicted long-run effect of an
increase in the value of the index by 7 points (equal to its median change between the initial and
final year of the sample) accompanied by a simultaneous increase in the interest rate from minus
10% per  annum to plus  5% (also a  "typical" change excluding the inflationary episodes during
some of the year in Chile and Ghana), results in a decrease of  saving equal to 5.5% of GNDI.
21 A variety  of  effects  may  be associated  with  inflation,  including  the  fact  that it is positively  correlated
with the private  sector's capital loss  on monetary  assets,  the relative-price  confusion  effect  of Deatori
(1977),  substitution  of consumer  durables  for financial  assets  as an inflation  hedge, or various  forms
of uncertainty.
16The general conclusions  we have reached concerning  the effects of financial liberalization  in
individual  countries  are robust to several changes  in the specification. For instnce, we obtain
similar  results if we use a weighted  average  of the first few principal  components  (with  the ratio of
the  standard deviation relative to  the total  standard deviation) as  an  index of  financial
liberalization. This is equivalent  to including  the principal  components  separately  and imposing
the restriction  that their coefficient  is proportional  to the fraction  of the total variance  explained  by
each one of them. We experimented  with adjusted  private and public saving rates and income  to
allow  for capital  gains and losses  induced  by inflation  on assets denominated  in local currency  (see
Table 6 for estimates  of the cointegrating  vector  in this case).  We also re-estimated  the model  by
using a "backward"  real interest rate, defined  as the nominal  interest rate minus the inflation  rate
over the preceding  period. We tried adding  the dependency  ratio to the cointegrating  vector; we
included  an interaction  term between  the interest  rate and the financial  liberalization  index  to allow
for the interest  rate effect  to differ  depending  upon the degree  of liberalization;  we used both linear
and quadratic  interest  rate terms  to capture  the idea  that the effect on savings  may depend  upon the
value of the interest  rate itself.  These  additional  variables  did not have significant  coefficients.  In
all of these  cases  the general  conclusions  concerning  the effect  of the liberalization  index  and of the
interest  rate on saving remain  unaltered.
V  Econometric Evidence:  Auemented Euler Eauations
T'he  negative  impact  of financial  liberalization  on saving found  for some countries  above suggests
that liberalization  may have weakened  credit or liquidity  constraints. Curiously,  despite  dramatic
changes in financial structure worldwide,  the Euler equation literature on liquidity constrined
consumption  has not focussed  on time-varying  constraints.
Here we start with the Campbell-Mankiw  (1989),  (1991)  approach  of estimating  an Euler equation
augmented  by the presence  of liquidity  constrained  consumers,  and attempt  to estimate  variation  in
the proportion  of constrained  consumers  as liberalization  proceeds. Thus, let 0 be the proportion
of unconstrained  consumers  and assume that the remainder  consume  all their income. If  f  is
constant  then two standard  Euler equations  are22:
For constant  interest  and quadratic  utility:
22  Cf.  Attanasio  and  Browning  (1995).
17ACt  = O - O)Ayto  + Oct  '(1)
For time-varying  interest  and CRRA  utility:
AInc,  = #0  + AlIny,' +qor  + Oct  (2)
wherep =-aln(I  + 6).  8 is the subjective  discount  rate, a  is the intertemporal  elasticity of
substitution  and yc  is the per-capita income of the constrained  consumers, assumed to be  a
constant 23 fraction q of per-capita  income  in the economy.
If we allow q to change  through  time  then (1) and (2) become:  24
AC,  = (I -0t)AY,  - At(rut-'  '-'C-  3
0t-l
AInc,  = (I - 0,)Alny,  + 0,  or, - t (Iny,_  -In  c,-l + In q) +  tu +{  (4)
where Elt=On  t]..
Equations  (3) and (4) emphasize  that the sensitivity  of consumption  to income  varies over  time, as
the  share  of  liquidity constrained consumers varies. Indeed, the  sensitivity of  aggregate
consumption  to current income  is due to the fact that some  consumers  consume  their income,  and
as such is proportional  to the relative size of the credit constrained  group.  The sensitivity  of
consumption  to the interest  rate also changes  over time in (4). But the main  novelty  is that the time-
variation  of 0  introduces  additional  regressors  in  (3) and (4). In particular,  there is a new term of
error-correction  type involving  lagged  consumption  and income,  whose  coefficient  is equal to the
rate of change in the proportion  of unconstrained  consumers. This consequence  of time varying
liquidity  constraints  seems  to have  been  overlooked  in the literature.
23  Assuming  iq constant  is necessary  to have  (3)  and (4)  below  in a tractable  form.
24 To derive  (3), define  per capita  consumption  c,  = (1- ot )Ct + %tc , where  the superscripts  u and  c
denote  unconstrained  and  constrained  consumers  respectively.  Then  take  first  differences  to obtain:
A(  - Ot)c,"  + AO,cc  = (I - t)Ac,'  + c,,A(I  - ,) +  ^tAcc+  c'A,^..
Substituting  the  definition  of cG, and  using  cc  = ?yt , gives  (3).  The  derivation  of (4)  proceeds
along  similar  lines,  using  a geometric  mean  with  population  weights  for  average  per capita
consumption  (whereas  in the  empirical  implementation  we  substitute  a simple  mean  consumption).
18The error term in (3) and (4) also depends  on 0, giving  rise to a need  to seek consistent  estimates
by IV or GMM techniques.  For instance,  assume  that the set of instruments  used, z,t,, belongs  to
the information  set available  at time t-1. If Ot  is also a function  of variables  known  at time t-1, then
E(z 11 ,  [,)=O since  the forecast  error a is by definition  uncorrelated  with variables at t-1.  More
precisely:
E(z,{,)  = E(z,  = E2 ,,)=  E  [E(z,- 1 1 ,o, I z, ,,  =  ,)]zE[z,-,,E(s,  Izt1,  0)]=°
if  E(,I,,0,)  = 
The last assumption  is plausible if financial  liberalization  measures are actually effective  one
period  after being  implemented  so that 0,depends  upon  the lagged  value  of the liberalization  index.
The final step is to relate Ot  to financial  liberalization.  We will assume that qt is an increasing
function  of the index  of financial  liberalization  lagged  one period,  flit-,.  In Table 7 we summarize
the empirical  results for the specification  that includes  the interest  rate,  estimated  by GMM (past
values  of the included  variables  are used as instruments). In the first part of the table we present
the estimates  of the model  under the assumption  of a constant [OO(see  equation (2)).  For the
majority  of countries  the coefficient  of income  is significant  at conventional  levels.  This is evidence
in favor of the presence  of liquidity  constraints. In the second  part of the table we have  adopted  a
logistic specification  for  0,, so that  4b,  = 1/(1+  exp(-ao  -a,  fli-, ))  and we have estimated
model (4).  If financial  liberalization  relaxes  financial  constraints  0, 1 would be positive.  For two
countries (Ghana and Zimbabwe),  we have not succeeded  in obtaining convergence.  For the
remaining  six countries,  the results, on the whole,  show lack of a significant  relationship  between
't  and the index. 25 In the only case, Turkey,  in which 0[, is significant  at conventional  levels,  it is
indeed  positive.  However,  Turkey  was the country  in which  the saving  function  results suggested  a
positive  direct  effect  of liberalization  on savings.
25  The  basic  sense  of the results  does  not change  if we allow t.o  to be different  when  the growth  rate of
income  is negative,  or if we  choose  a different  functional  fonn (such  as the  Gumbel)  for 0.
19The Euler equation  results suggest  that financial  liberalization  has had little impact  on the amount
of credit  available  to consumers  through  the formal  financial  sector Alternatively,  the inconclusive
results may stem  from  the econometric  problem  of pinning  down  what is essentially  the coefficient
of the product of a non-stationary  variable  (flit), with a stationary  one (Aln  y,).  More generally,
one might question  the adequacy of the instruments  used in estimating  the augmented  Euler
equations.
A further reason for us to expect to find (as we do) a stronger  influence  of liberalization  in our
savings equation by comparison  with the Euler equation, is that the dependent  variable of the
former  relates  to total private  saving  (business  as well  as household  sectors)  while  the latter relates
in principle  only to household  sector  behavior. Just as it is more sensitive  to exogenous  shocks
(Honohan  and Atiyas, 1993),  business  saving in developing  countries  may be more influenced  by
liberalization  than household behavior, especially as the latter may be more conditioned  by
informal  finance  than by reforms  that affect mainly  the formal  sector.
VI.  Conclusions
Our econometric  results confirm  the visual impression  from the figures, as well as much  previous
literature,  that there is no strong reliable  interest rate effect on savings. Only when the data is
pooled  and one assumes  that the long-run  coefficients  are equal across countries  (a restriction  that
the data rejects)  can we find evidence  of a significant  positive  interest rate effect on saving  -- and
even  then  the effect is small.
Our index of financial liberalization  captures several aspects of reform that  are not fully
represented  by changes  in the interest  rate, such as the increased  availability  of a variety  of saving
media  with better risk-return  characteristics  or the relaxation  of borrowing  constraints,  following
financial  reform. But here too, the econometric  evidence  on the impact  of reform  on saving  is very
nixed.  When savings  functions  are estimated  for each of the countries  separately,  the long-run
effect is found  to be significantly  negative  for two (Korea and Mexico),  positive  for two (Ghana
and Turkey),  with no clear effect is discernible  in the others. When the long run responses  are
constrained  to be equal,  the effect  of the financial  liberalization  index  is significantly  negative  and
large  enough  to offset  in these  constrained  estimates  the positive  effect  of the interest  rate increases
that have  accompanied  the reforms.
20Estimation of the augmented Euler equation for consumption confirms previous evidence of excess
sensitivity of consumption to income. However, with the exception of Turkey, there is not much
evidence that such sensitivity has decreased with financial liberalization, although this may due to
the econometric difficulty of obtaining precise estimates of the parameters.
This tentative finding of a negative average value for the effect of liberalization on saving suggests
that the negative impact of relaxation of borrowing constraints is the dominant factor.  The fact
that the estimated effect varies from country to country  suggests that the  process  of financial
liberalization may have increased consumers' access to credit in differing degrees from country to
country to an extent not fully captured by our index. In this context it would be of interest to try to
decompose the effects of the reform package further, but our data here is not rich enough to do
that.
Another important  distinctive characteristic  at  the  country-level is the macro-management that
followed the liberalization. As already mentioned, countries undertaking financial reform are prone
to an excessive transitory boom in credit, often linked with a surge in property prices.  The degree
to which this occurs depends on macroeconomic and monetary policy.  Thus contrasting monetary
policy may have the effect of contaminating the estimated impact of liberalization per se.  Further
evidence on the accompanying macroeconomic policies for a larger sample of countries would be
needed to resolve this issue.
For the present, our  results suggest that, while financial liberalization may  sometimes increase
private saving, the opposite can also be the case.  Considering that government saving can also be
adversely affected, 26 it would be unwise to rely on an increase in savings as the channel through
which financial liberalization can be expected to increase growth.
Even if financial liberalization does not increase private saving, it does not follow that the process
contracts the volume of funds applied to productive investment.  For one thing, liberalization can
26  As noted earlier,  financial  liberalization  includes  reducing  below  market  financing  for government,  and
may  also increase  expenditurcs  by requiring  that subsidies  be explicit. However,  in addition  to
longer  term gains in revenue  due to more  rapid growth,  in the near bank privatization,  at least in the
right regulatory  environment,  can save  substantial  sums,  as in Argentina  (Clarke  and Cull, 1997).
21increase  the inflow of capital, including  the return of flight capital (Bartolini  and Drazen, 1997).
For another, by strengthening  market discipline  and increasing  the autonomy  of banks and other
financial  institutions,  the various  elements  of the reform  process  can have  the effect of eliminating
less productive  uses of loanable  funds. These  two potentially  important  aspects  are not considered
in the present  paper.
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26APPENDIX  1. Building  an Index  for  Financial  Liberalization.
Financial  liberalization  packages  generally  consist  of  a  wide  range  of  different
measures.  As explained  in  the  text  we  summarize  all  the  information  available  on  the
liberalization  process  by a  single  index.
One  way  of building  the  overall  index  of  financial  liberalization  is  to  use  principal
components  methods.  The  idea  is  to  associate  a  dummy  variable  to  each  reform
measure.  Its  value  equals  one  in the  years  characterized  by the  liberalized  regime,  and
zero  otherwise.  We collect  all  the  dummy  variables  as  columns  of  a  matrix  X,  and
then  compute  the  principal  components  of X.  In the  text  we use  two  different  indexes.
One  is  just  the  first  principal  component  (i.e.  the  vector  that  explains  the  greater
portion  of variance).  The  second  one  is  computed  as  a  weighted  average  of the  more
relevant  components  that  explain,  cumulatively,  95% of  the  total  variation  of X.  We
use  the  fraction  of  the  total  standard  deviation  explained  by  each  component  as
weights,  so  that  the  first  principal  component  is  weighted  more  than  the  second  and
so on.
The columns  of X representing  the  timing  of the  most important  liberalization
measures  and  are  ordered  according  to the  following  scheme:
1. Domestic  Financial  Liberalization.
l.a  Interest  rates.
Dummies  for  the  timing  of liberalization  of interest  rates  (Dri=l  when  interest  rates
are freed)
1.b  Pro-competition  measures.
Includes  lowering  of entry  barriers,  permissions  to offer  new services  and  other
measures  intended  to foster  competition  in the  financial  markets.  (Dco=l  when
measures  are  taken)
l.c  Reserve  requirements.
Most financial  liberalization  packages  include  a reduction  in reserve  requirements,
which  increases  the  funds  available  for  lending.  (Dres=l  when  reserve  requirements
are  reduced)
1.d  Directed  Credit
This  set  of variables  includes  all  the  measures  aimed  to reduce  the  amount  of
preferential  loans,  or loans  at  a preferential  rate,  banks  are  forced  to make.  (Dpr=l
when  directed  credit  is  reduced.)
i.e  Banks'  ownership
Dpriv=l  when  banks  are privatized  or government  controls  are  reduced.
1.f  Prudential  Regulation.
27Typically financial  liberalization  programs include a strengthening  of prudential
regulation and supervisory powers of the CB. This is relevant in which it can increase
the trust  in the financial  system and hence attract  more deposits.  (Dreg=1 when
prudential  regulation measures are in force)
2. Securities  Markets
These variables  capture the measures aimed at deregulating  and developing the
securities  and stock markets (Dst=l  when markets are deregulated)
3. International  Financial  Liberalization.
Domestic financial  liberalization  is generally paired  with international  liberalization
both in the capital  and in the current account. Here we use the information relative  to
the capital account and the exchange rate.  (Df=1 when capital movements and/or the
exchange rate are liberalized).
28CHILE
1.  Domestic  Financial  Liberalization.
l.a  Interest  rates.
1974(may)  Interest  rates  for  institutions  other  than  commercial  banks,  the  state
bank,  and  saving  and  loans  are freed.
1974(june)  Controls  on  deposit  rates  are  abolished
1975(may)  Controls  on  lending  rates  are  abolished
1975(oct)  Controls  are  re-imposed  on both  rates
1976(jan)  Controls  are  removed
1977(sept)  Banks  are  allowed  to  make  contracts  using  a unit  of account  anchored
to the  CPI
1982(dec.)  Central  bank  "suggests"  deposit  rates
1986(jan)  Controls  (i.e.  suggestions)  on  interest  rates  are  definitely  abolished
L.b Pro-competition  measures.
1975  Entry  barriers  are  lowered.
LIc Reserve  requirements.
1974(oct)  Reserve  requirements  on  short  term(  1 to  12 months)  time  deposits  are
reduced  (from  40% to 8%)
1975(jul)  reserve  requirements  on  demand  deposits  are  reduced  (before  base
rate=100%  marginal  rate=80%,  after  uniform  rate=  80%)
1975(aug)  technical  reserve  requirements  on  short  term  time  deposits  are
increased  (to  80%,  to be fulfilled  by a mandatory  investment  in  T-bills)
1976(may)  CB pays  interest  rate  on  reserves
1976  reserve  requirements  are  reduced  on  demand  deposits  (to  59%),  on
(may-dec77)  1-3m time  dep.  (to 20%)  and  on 3-12m  time  deposits  (to 8%).
1978(jan-jul)  reserve  requirements  are  reduced  on demand  deposits  ( to 42%)
1979  reserve  requirements  are  reduced  on  demand  deposits  ( to 21%),  on  1-
(april-dec)  3m time  deposits  ( to 8%),
1979(sep)  CB stops  paying  interest  on  reserves
1980  reserve  requirements  are  reduced  on  demand  deposits  ( to  10%),  on  1-
(jan-dec.)  3m time  dep.  (to 4%) and  on 3-12m  time  deposits  (to  4%).
L.d Directed  Credit  & Credit  Ceilings
1926  credit  ceilings  are  introduced
1974(jan-sept)  new,  more  relaxed  ceilings  are  introduced
1974(oct-dec.)  ceilings  are  completely  abolished
1975(jan-jul)  ceilings  are  re-established  but banks  are allowed  to  increase
their  loans  by the  increment  in time  deposits  over  the
outstanding  amount  as of september  1974
1975(aug)-1976(mar)  the ceiling  is  set a the  amount  of outstanding  loans  as of jul  75
1976  (april)  ceilings  are  definitely  abandoned
291.e Banks'  ownership
1975  Banks  are privatized
1982  Banks  are  under  special  government  administration
1986  Banks  are  re-privatized.
1.f  Prudential  Regulation.
1986(nov)  New banking  law,  includes  prudential  measures  and  strengthens  the
supervisory  system.
1987  Deposit  Insurance  Scheme  is introduced.
3.  International  Financial  Liberalization.
1975(jan)  Ceilings  on  foreign  borrowing  are  reduced  (from  200%  to  100% of
capital  and  reserves)
1976(jun)  Ceilings  on  foreign  borrowing  are  increased  (to  150%)
1978(jan)  Foreign  borrowing  is authorized  for  every  purpose  (before  it was
allowed  only  for  financing  loans  related  to foreign  trade)
1978(mar)  Ceilings  on  foreign  borrowing  are  increased  (to  160%)
1978(apr)  Short  term  foreign  borrowing  by banks  is forbidden.  Reserves  are
imposed  on  long-term  borrowing  (rates  are  differentiated  according  to
maturity).  Limits  on foreign  currency  loans  are  imposed  (both  stock  and
flow)
1978(dec.)  Ceilings  on  foreign  borrowing  are  increased  (to  180%)
1979(jun)  Ceilings  on  foreign  borrowing  are  abolished
1980(jan)  reserve  req.  on foreign  currency  deposits  are  reduced
1980(apr)  limits  on foreign  currency  loans  are  eliminated.  (after  this  the  only
restrictions  left  on  capital  movements  are  the  prohibition  of short
term(2yrs)  foreign  loans  and  reserve  req.  on  loans  with  maturities
between  2yrs  and  51/2yrs)
1984  Capital  movements  are  restricted.
1991  Restrictions  are  reduced  again.
GHANA
1.  Domestic  Financial  Liberalization.
l.a  Interest  rates.
1987  (9)  Decontrolled  all  interest  rates.
l.b  Pro-competition  measures.
1993(5)  Enacted  new law  to foster  competition  among  commercial  banks.  Also
enacted  Home  Mortgage  Finance  Law to  support  development  of
housing  finance.
301.d Directed  Credit
1988  (2)  Removed  almost  all  credit  controls  (except  agriculture)
1990(11)  Removed  lending  targets  for  the  agricultural  sector.
1.e Banks'  ownership
The  sector  is  dominated  by  State-owned  institutions.  There  have  not been  changes  in
this  direction.
1.f  Prudential  Regulation.
1989(8)  Enacted  a Banking  Law providing  for  minimum  capital  and  prudential
lending  guidelines.
2.  Securities  Markets
1986  Introduced  weekly  foreign  exchange  auction.
1987  (10)  Introduce  weekly  auctions  of T-bills.
1987  (11)  Establishment  of the  Consolidated  Discount  House.
1990  (11)  Stock Exchange  Operations  Begin.
3.  International  Financial  Liberalization.
No reforms  in this  area.  Capital  movements  are  still  subject  to controls.
INDONESIA
1. Domestic  Financial  Liberalization.
1.a Interest  rates.
1983  Interest  rates  on  loans  and  deposits  are  freed.  (Except  rates  on  loans
refinanced  by  CB)
1.b  Pro-competition  measures.
1988  Entry  of new banks  is allowed.  Banks  who  satisfy  the  criteria  for
(10-12)  financial  soundness  are  allowed  to open  new branches.  All banks  can
issue  Cds and  are  allowed  to offer  new services.
1.c  Reserve  requirements.
1988  Reserve  requirements  are  reduced  from  15% to  2%
1.d Directed  Credit
311983  The role  of CB in  allocating  credit  is reduced.  The  number  of
categories  of credit  for  which  banks  would  be refinanced  by CB is reduced.
1990  Most  of the  liquidity  credit  arrangements  for  priority  loans  are eliminated.
1.f Prudential  Regulation.
1989  Prudential  measures  as capital  adequacy  ratio  are  introduced.
1991  Prudential  measures  are  reinforced.
1992  New prudential  measures  are  approved  and  the  supervisory  power  of CB is
reinforced.
2.  Securities  Markets
1977  The  Stock Exchange  opens  in its  present  form but  remains  virtually  inactive
until  1989.
1988  New measures  to strengthen  and  deregulate  the  stock  market.
3.  International  Financial  Liberalization.
No controls  on  capital  movements  and  foreign  exchange.
KOREA
1.  Domestic  Financial  Liberalization.
L.a Interest  rates.
1984  Financial  intermediaries  (non-bank)  are  given  discretionary  power  in
determining  their  lending  rate.
1988  Most  banks'  lending  and  long  term  deposits  rates  are  deregulated.
1.b Pro-competition  measures.
1983  Entry  barriers  are  lowered  and  banks  are  allowed  to introduce  new
services.
1989  Entry  Barriers  are  lowered  again.  The cstablishment  of new financial
institutions  is approved.
1.d  Directed  Credit
The  share  of policy  loans  is quite  high,  after  peaking  at  the  cnd  of the  70s.  No
significant  measures  have  yet been  taken  to  reducc  it.
L.e Banks'  ownership.
Although  they  have  been  privatized  in  1981-3  banks  remain  heavily  controlled  by the
State.
321.f Prudential Regulation.
1991  General  Banking  Act  introduces  new prudential  measures  and  imposes
supervisory  regulations
2.  Securities  Markets
1984  Establishment  of the Korea  Fund.
1992  The  stock  market  opens  for  direct  purchase  by foreigners.
3.  International  Financial  Liberalization.
Capital  movements  and  the  exchange  rate  are  still  heavily  regulatcd.  Significant  dates
are:
1981  Capital  movements  are  less  controlled
1989  Foreign  Exchange  market  is established.
NB:  Although  the  bank  sector  is still  quite  regulated,  non-bank  financial
intermediaries  are  not.  Financial  markets  in  Korea  have  become  more  dercgulated
essentially  because  the  share  of non-bank  intermediaries  has  grown  noticeably.  To
capture  this  effect  we include  the  series  (financial  intermediaries'  claims  to  private
sector/GDP)  in  the financial  liberalization  index.
MALAYSIA
1. Domestic  Financial  Liberalization.
1.a Interest  rates.
1971  Interest  Rates  on  long  term  (4 or more  years)  deposits  are  liberalized.
1972  Rates  on  deposits  with  maturity  greater  than  I year  are  frecd.
1973  Rates  on deposits  placed  with  finance  companics  are  freed.
1978  All interest  rates  of commercial  banks  are  freed.
1984  New  controls  are  set on  the  lending  rates.  Specifically,  the  Base
Lending  Rate  (BLR)  is introduced.  Lending  rates  offered  by every  bank
and  finance  company  are  then  anchored  to  their  declared  BLR,
determined  on the  basis  of the  cost  of funds  taking  into  account  the  cost
of statutory  reserves,  liquid  assets  requirements  and  overheads.
1985(oct)  Controls  on deposits  rates  arc  reintroduced.
1987(jan)  Controls  on  deposits  rates  are  eliminatcd.
1987(apr)  Interest  rates  on  priority  lending  are  pegged  to the  BLR
1987(sep)  The  CB imposes  new, and  more  restrictive,  guidelines  for  the
determination  of the  BLR
1991  The BLR is freed  from  CB's  control.
331.d  Directed  Credit
1975  Priority  lending  is  introduced.  CB  controls  both  the  quantity  and  the
interest  charged  on  primary  borrowers.
1979  CB issues  annual  priority  lending  guidelines.  still  leaving  considerable
discretion  to the  banks  and  without  seriously  distorting  the  interest
rates.
1991  The  number  of priority  sectors  and  the  required  loan  amount  is reduced.
1.f  Prudential  Regulation.
1989  The Banking  and Financial  Institutions  Act  cxtends  and  strengthens
CB's  supervisory  powers.
2.  Securities  Markets
1973  Discount  Rates  on  T-bills  are  determined  by  opcn  tendcr  in the  money
market.
1989  Measures  to move toward  a  market-based  pricing  of government  X
market.
3.  International  Financial  Liberalization.
1973  Exchange  rate  regulations  are  relaxed  to allow  a freer  flow of funds  to
and  from  Malaysia
1987  New measures  to provide  investors  with  grcatcr  access  to crcdit.
Notes.
(1)  In mid-82  Malaysia  started  a multi-year  structural  adjustment  program.
MEXICO
1. Domestic  Financial  Liberalization.
L.a Interest rates.
1988-89  Interest  rates are liberalized.
L.b Pro-competition measures.
1990  New legal  framework  for  banks  and  non-banks  financial  intermediaries.
The  new law promotes  competition,  allows  the  introduction  of new
34services  and  establishes  prudential  measures.  Also,  favors  the
development  of non-bank  financial  institutions.
1.c Reserve  requirements.
1989  Reserve  requirements  are  reduced.
l.d  Directed  Credit
1988  Elimination  of forced  lending.
1991  Elimination  of the  "liquidity  coefficicnt",  requiring  that  30% of
deposits  be invested  in  T-bills.
1992  Elimination  of regulations  rcquiring  that  banks  hold  long  term
government  bonds  until  maturity.
i.e  Banks'  ownership
1982  Banks  are  nationalized.  Credit  to  private  sector  falls  sharply.
1992  Banks  are  privatized.
2.  Securities  Markets
1988-92  During  this  period  measures  have been  taken  to  deregulate  the
securities  market  and  promote  its  development.  Dcspite  rcecnt  growvth
the  securities  market  is still  under-developed.
3.  International  Financial  Liberalization.
1989  Restriction  on  Foreign  Direct  lnvcstment  arc  removcd.
Notes:
1) Mexico  started  a macro-adjustmcnt  program  in  1988.
TURKEY
1. Domestic  Financial  Liberalization.
l.a  Interest rates.
1981  Interest  rate  ceilings  arc  abolished  (except  o(t  sigh.t  deposits  and  on
preferential  lending)
1983  Ceilings  are  reintroduced.
1987  Open  market  operations  start.
1988  Ceilings  are  eliminated.
351.b Pro-competition  measures.
1980  Cds are  introduced.
1981  Barriers  to entry  are  lowered.
L.f Prudential  Regulation.
1986  A new banking  law becomes  effective.  The  law provides  supervisory
and  prudential  measures.  A Bank Supervision  Unit  is crcated  within  the
Central  Bank.
2.  Securities  Markets
1983  The Capital  market  Board  is established.  CMB promotes  and  monitors
developments  in the  securities  markets.
1985  Government  Securities  are  auctioned.  Their  yields  are  market-
determined.
1986  The  Istanbul  Stock Exchange  becomes  operativc.
3.  International  Financial  Liberalization.
1984  Foreign  Exchange  deregulation:  residents  arc  allowed  to hold  forcign
currency  denominated  deposits  (FCCDs)  . Banks  are  allowed  to  keep
foreign  currency  abroad  and  are  given  somc discretionary  power  in
determining  the  exchange  rate.
1985  New  restrictions  on  foreign  exchange  are  introduced.
1988  Foreign  Exchange  is liberalized.
1989  Capital  movements  are  liberalized.
1990  The Exchange  rate  is liberalized.
ZIMBABWE
1. Domestic  Financial  Liberalization.
L.a Interest  rates.
1991  Restrictions  on all  interest  rates  arc climinated.
1.b  Pro-competition  measures.
No special  measures  have  been  taken  in this  ficld  and  banks  havc  only  very  recently
started  to  offer  new services.  Although  the  number  of financial  institutions  and  the
range  of services  offered  are  impressivc  by African  standards,  competition  is scarce.
Some new institutions  have  entered  the  financial  market  but this  has  not changed  the
status  quo.
361.c Reserve requirements.
1991  Reserve Requirements are reduced.
2.  Securities  Markets
1973  The Stock Exchange is created.
1993  The Stock market is opened to foreign investors.
3.  International  Liberalization
1994  The  current  account and the foreign exchange are liberalized
Notes:
1. The program started  in 1991 included measures to reduced the budget deficit, but
these have been quite unsuccessful.
2. There has been a minor deregulation  in  1988.
37APPENDIX  2- Variables  Definitions  and Data Sources.
(s/y)t = private saving rate = (private savings/ GNDI)t
private savings = gross national savings - public sector savings
gross national savings, Source: WB "World Savings Database" Rev. 3.00.
public  sector  savings-  (1) for  CHL, KOR,  MEX, MYS,  TUR - savings of the non-
financial  public  sector (= consolidated  central  government  + state and local governments  +
non financial  public  enterprises)  computed  as revenues  minus consumption  - Source: WB
"World Savings Database" Rev. 3.00. (2) for IDN savings of the consolidated  central
government  computed as revenues rninus  consumption  - Source: WB "World Savings
Database" Rev. 3.00.  (3) for Ghana - savings of the consolidated  central government
computed as buget surplus  plus public investment  - Source: Ghana-Quarterly  Digest of
Statistics  (4) for Zimbabwe  - savings  of the consolidated  central  government  computed  as
buget surplus  plus public  investment  - Source:  World Bank National  Accounts  + Easterly
database.
GNDI: GNP + External Transfers - Source: WB "World Savings Database" Rev. 3.00.
yt = log of real per-capita  income  = ln(GNDI/  population*defl),
population: Source  WB BESD database.
-,  =  inflation rate =Aln(deflt+j).
defl: implicit  consumption  price deflator - year average- Source: WB "World Savings
Database"  Rev. 3.00.
rt = real interest rate = (1) for IDN, KOR, MYS  rt = In (1+ it') - Aln(defl,+ 1)  (2) for CHL,
GHA, MEX, TUR, ZWE  r, = 0.5(ln (1+ itd)  +  0.5( ln (1+ it_ld))  - Aln(deflt+i)).
ia =  nominal interest rate = short term deposit rate, year average - Source : Central Banks
Bulletins.
jd = nominal interest rate  = short term deposit rate, December value - Source : Central
Banks  Bulletins.
flit = index of financial liberalisation  - Source: our calculations
govst = public sector saving rate (relative to  GNDI) - Source: WB "World Savings
Database" Rev. 3.00.
38(s/y)' = private savings  ratio adjusted  for domestic  capital gains - Source: WB "World
Savings  Database"  Rev. 3.00.
yt'= GNDI adjusted for domestic  capital  gains  - Source: WB "World Savings  Database"
Rev. 3.00 + our calculations
govsia=  public  sector saving  rate adjusted  for domestic  capital  gains  - Source:  WB "World
Savings  Database"  Rev. 3.00.
39TABLE 1: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
M2/GNDI  Private  rt  (3/Y)L
CreditIGNDI
CHILE
fli,  0.614  0.74  0.767  0.153
(3.72)  (5.31)  (5.74)  (0.74)
flui.-  0.671  0.800  0.806  0.141
(4.23)  (6.25)  (6.32)  (0.70)
nit. 2 0.761  0.844  0.73  0.173
(5.36)  (7.23)  (5.01)  (0.82)
GHANA
nit  -0.35  -0.07  0.44  -0.29
(-1.79)  (-0.34)  (2.39)  (-1.48)
flib.  -0.27  -0.0006  0.4  -0.26
(-1.33)  (-0.03)  (2.10)  (-1.3)
flit. 2 -0.24  0.10  0.41  -0.29
(-1.16)  (0.50)  (2.12)  (-1.13)
INDONESI
A
lit  0.94  0.95  0.52  0.37
(13.80)  (13.92)  (2.91)  (1.89)
lit.,  0.91  0.93  0.42  0.35
(10.60)  (11.38)  (2.18)  (1.71)
flit- 2 0.87  0.88  0.35  0.377
(7.98)  (8.68)  (1.70)  (1.78)
KOREA
fli, 0.878  0.905  0.311  0.739
(8.60)  (10.03)  (1.54)  (5.16)
fli,.,  0.S6  0.883  0.300  0.721
(7.82)  (8.78)  (1.47)  (4.79)
flit2 0.83  0.854  0.282  0.748
(6.72)  (7.50)  (1.33)  (5.09)
MALAYSI
A
fli,  0.75  0.76  0.34  -0.22
(5.46)  (5.69)  (1.71)  (-1.08)
fli.,  0.77  0.78  0.58  -0.39
(5.79)  (5.97)  (3.43)  (-1.99)
nlil,2  0.79  0.81  0.71  -0.57
40(6.04)  (6.33)  (4.59)  (-3.17)
MEXICO
fli  0.20  0.82  0.36  -0.59
(0.99)  (8.91)  (1.79)  (-3.47)
1li3. 1 0.22  0.87  0.31  -0.59
(1.13)  (8.34)  (1.60)  (-3.5)
fli.. 2 0.22  0.69  0.3  -0.59
(1.07)  (6.81)  (1.42)  (3.39)
TURKEY
fli.  0 76  0.004  0.30  0.87
,* -6I  (0.01I9)  (1.50)  (8.97)
Ol. ;  '!  '4  0.003  0.28  0.89
S1  22,  (0.02)  (1.42)  (9.46)
0.04  0.24  0.89
,; ?'7  jO.24)  (I.I9)  (9.39)
.o043  0.64  0.24  0.2
.- 1.72)  (3.02)  (0.87)  (0.87)
!-063  0.65  0.12  0.16
(-,.83)  (3.09)  (0.44)  (0.67)
-0  38  0.64  0.3  0.02
(.1.40)  (2.79)  (1.09)  (0.22)
Notes: I statistics in parcnthcsis. Private credit denotes the stock of credit to the private sector.
41Table 2: Panel Integration and Cointegration Tests
Part I
(s/Y)t  In  y,  r,  flit  nt  govst
without trend
P=0  -0.617  2.623  -4.152  7.165  -3.495  -0.141
P=l  -0.458  1.300  -3.393  5.090  -3.300  -0.859
with trend
P=(C  0.027  1.213  -3.707  4.676  -3.517  -0.589
P=l  -1.645  -0.302  -4.076  3.491  -3.892  -2.014
Part  ll
cointegrating vector 1: Ks y),, ln y,, r,, flit, ,if,  govs,]
cointegrating  vector 2: [(s/y),lnyt,fl  , govst
Panel conintegration test  cointegrating vector 1  cointegrating vector 2
ADF t test
(Pedroni)  -2.27  -2.74
Panel ADF  -4.677  -4.95
(Im, Pesaram, Shin on residuals)
Notes:
1. P denotes the number of lags in the country specific ADF test.
2. The Panel Integration  test is based on Im, Pesaran, Shin (1995). The test is distributed  as N
(0,1).  The unit root hypothesis  is rejected  at the 5% significance  level  for values  below  -1.645.
3. The panel ADF t test is based on Pedroni (1997, a b). The test is distributed as N (0,1).
42Table 3: Estimating  the Cointegrating  Vector for Savings
Part I: OLS for (s/y),  = AO  +A In  y, + f2rt + /33fli1 + f 4 rgt +  5 govst  +U,
CHL  GHA  IDN  KOR  MYS  MEX  TUR  ZWE
Constant  -2.084  -1.120  -0.859  -2.491  -1.186  -0.890  0.450  -1.828
(3.209)  (-2.225)  (-1.88)  (-7.658)  (-2.086)  (-3.025)  (0.382)  (-0.912)
Iny,  0.171  0.11  0.094  0.192  0.185  0.129  -0.016  0.287
(3.385)  (2.550)  (2.525)  (8.328)  (2.716)  (3.521)  (-0.195)  (1.010)
rt  -0.047  -0.176  -0.61  -0.208  -0.655  0.117  -0.063  0.123
(-0.740)  (-0.643)  (-4.031)  (-1.232)  (-1.982)  (2.66)  (-1.184)  (0.28)
fli,  0.001  0.005  0.003  -0.015  -0.003  -0.012  0.016  0.005
(0.321)  (1.308)  (0.638)  (-2.614)  (-0.473)  (-7.104)  (4.168)  (0.187)
n ,  -0.036  -0.140  -0.687  -0.067  -0.868  0.133  -0.093  0.042
(-0.529)  (-0.540)  (-3.812)  (-0.489)  (-2.446)  (2.422)  (-1.277)  (0.089)
govs 1 0.267  -0.645  -1.427  (-1.080)  -1.321  -0.579  (-0.364)  -0.143
0.896  (-3.199)  (-2.670)  (-2.592)  (-7.882)  (-2.351)  (-1.756)  (-0.398)
NOBS  25  25  24  24  25  25  25  20
43Table  3: Estimating  the  Cointegrating  Vector  for  Savings
Part  II: Dynamic  GLS for  (sl  y),  = A  + A  In y,  + 82r, +  83fli, +84r,  + 45govs,  + u,
CHL  GHA  IDN  KOR  MYS  MEX  TUR  ZWE
Constant  -4.066  -1.692  -2.337  -9.802  0.091  -1.766  0.914  -1.822
(-3 .081)  (-3.121)  (-4.289)  (3.47)  (0.14)  (-4.261)  (0.336)  (-0.525)
In yt  0.326  0.172  0.209  0.476  0.027  0.247  -0.050  0.346
(3.134)  (3.445)  (4.737)  (4.351)  (0.343)  (4.642)  (-0.259)  (0.683)
rt  0.138  -1.691  -0.818  -0.35  -0.639  -0.062  -0.068  -1.364
(1.454)  (-2.217)  (4.888)  (-1.606)  (-1.710)  (-1.038)  (-0.712)  (-1.338)
flit  -0.001  0.016  -0.005  -0.023  0.01  -0.009  0.019  0.063
(-0.107)  (2.024)  (-1.035)  (-2.365)  (1.345)  (-3.821)  (2.100)  (0.738)
n  t  0.152  -1.203  -0.684  -0.383  -0.791  0.100  -0.087  -2.107
(1.585)  (-2.313)  (-3.649)  (-1.641)  (-2.172)  (1.639)  (-0.689)  (-1.450)
govst  -1.087  1.021  -2.66  -0.969  -0.976  -0.867  -0.173  0.184
(-2.017)  (1.218)  (4.200)  (-2.386)  (4.909)  (3.663)  (0.385)  (0.360)
NOBS  23  23  22  22  23  23  23  18
44Table 3: Estimating the Cointegrating Vector for Savings
Part  III: Dynamic GLS for (s  y),  = ,, +,61  In y, +/36fli, + 6 5govs, +u,
CHL  GHA  IDN  KOR  MYS  MEX  TUR  ZWE
Constant  -1.701  -1.747  -0.335  -8.083  -0.227  -1.877  1.362  -7.497
(2.246)  (-4.371)  (-0.354)  (-4.431)  (-0.301)  (-4.096)  (0.827)  (-5.082)
In yt  0.143  0.166  0.043  0.418  0.060  0.266  -0.083  0.443
(2.384)  (4.571)  (0.567)  (5.877)  (0.658)  (4.566)  (-0.716)  (6.154)
flit  0.003  0.003  0.003  -0.02  0.004  -0.01  0.015  -0.027
(0.274)  (0.132)  (0.326)  (-2.269)  (0.561)  (-3.544)  (3.020)  (-2.461)
govst  -0.206  -0.463  -0.719  -1.000  -1.014  -1.297  -0.180  -0.989
(-0.485)  (-2.329)  (-0.749)  (-2.905)  (-4.634)  (-8.804)  (-0.550)  (-2.844)
NOBS  23  23  22  22  23  23  23  18
Notes:
1.  t-statistics  in parenthesis.
2.  The  dynamic  GLS estimates  have  been  obtained  by adding  the contemporaneous  changes  of all
the RHS variables  as additional  regressors  and by allowing  for AR (1) errors.
45Table 4: Error Correction Model for Savings
A(s  l y)t = a. + yf1A(s  / y)  X + a1A in  y,  + a 2Ar,  + a 3AJfli  + a4 A7r,  + a5 govs,  + , 1 ec1,l  + ut
CHL  GHA  IDN  KOR  MYS  MEX  TUR  ZWE
Constant  0.004  0.001  -0.011  -0.022  -0.011  -0.006  -0.001  0.009
(0.537)  (0.225)  (-2.051)  (-4.997)  (-2.352)  (-1.871)  (-0.203)  (0.467)
A (s/y),]  -0.082  0.072  0.149  0.110  -0.077  0.297  0.172  -0.023
(-0471)  (0.420)  (1.214)  (1.064)  (-0.624)  (2.281)  (0.722)  (-0.068)
A In  y  0.166  0.100  0.215  0.465  0.430  0.125  0.015  0.186
(3.216)  (1.432)  (3.269)  (8.747)  (5.463)  (1.886)  (0.176)  (0.681)
A r,  -0.005  -0.336  -0.318  -0.128  -0.908  0.216  0.030  -0.263
(-0.076)  (0.788)  (-1.486)  (1.368)  (-3.092)  (4.911)  (0.358)  (-0.533)
A f.  -0.010  0.011  -0.003  -0.013  0.000  0.006  0.010  -0.014
(-0.862)  (1.212)  0.470  (-2.388)  (-0.068)  (0.791)  (1.145)  (-0.436)
A n t  -0.033  -0.279  -0.478  -0.107  -1.360  0.271  0.036  -0.371
(-0.482)  (-0.824)  (-2.827)  (-1.083)  (-4.429)  (5.417)  (0.386)  (-0.749)
A  govs,  0.146  -0.745  -0.983  -1.297  -1.319  -0.159  -0.239  -0.091
-0.586  (-3.104)  (-2.332)  (-6.897)  (-9.548)  (-8.885)  (-0.847)  (-0.304)
cc,  l  -0.344  -1.071  -0.890  -0.429  -0.856  -0.779  -0.697  -0.274
(-1.612)  (-3.473)  (-4.893)  (-3.078)  (-3.398)  (-3.644)  (-2.485)  (-0.806)
R2  0.500  0.583  0.730  0.872  0.864  0.897  0.176  0.000
BGtest  0.088  0.085  0.179  0.167  0.57  0.126  0.619  0.025
NOBS  23  23  22  22  23  23  23  18
Notes:
1. t-statistics in parenthesis.
2. BG denotes the marginal significance level for the Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation up
to the second order.
46Table  5: Restricted  SURE  Estimates
(1)  (2)
In  Yt  0.120  0.207
(16.93)  (14.13)
r t  0.061  0.101
(3.42)  (3.62)
flit  -0.003  -0.010
(-3.125)  (-8.440)
n,  t  0.065  0.168
(3.498)  (10.696)
govst  -0.745  -0.660
(-14.425)  (-16.446)
NOBS  160  144
LR  0.000  0.000
Notes:
1. t-statistics in parenthesis.
2. LR denotes the marginal significance level of the likelihood ratio
test on the equality across countries of the long run coefficients.
47Table 6: Cointegrating Vector for Savings Adjusting for Domestic Capital Gains
Part  I: OLS  for (s  Iy)  =,  + fl,  In  ya  +  62r,  +  ±3J[i  +  fl4 lr  +  f 5goVSa  + U
CHL  GHA  IDN  KOR  MYS  MEX  TUR  ZWE
Constant  -2.109  -1.539  -0.77  -2.438  -0.294  -0.631  0.097  -1.819
(-3.946)  (-3.015)  (-1.960)  (-7.682)  (-0.518)  (-2.821)  (0.085)  (-0.705)
Inyt  0.173  0.148  0.087  0.188  0.077  0.103  0.008  0.283
(4.174)  (3.363)  (2.734)  (8.441)  (1.131)  (3.586)  (0.097)  (0.757)
r,  0.000  -0.195  -0.619  -0.225  -0.927  0.093  -0.058  0.203
(0.007)  (-0.747)  (-4.009)  (-1.342)  (-2.644)  (2.741)  (-1.071)  (0.421)
flit  0.000  0.005  0.004  (0.016)  0.005  (0.009)  0.017  (0.009)
(0.085)  (1.246)  (0.962)  (-2.591)  (0.806)  (-4.862)  (4.014)  (-0.123)
n,  -0.038  -0.186  -0.700  -0.075  -1.031  0.140  -0.151  0.033
(-0.679)  (-0.717)  (-3.788)  (-0.548)  (-2.583)  (3.281)  (-2.155)  (0.058)
govst  0.059  -0.425  -1.356  -0.432  -1.005  -0.792  -0.274  -0.029
-0.331  (-1.539)  (-2.906)  (-2.406)  (-6.370)  (-5.623)  (-1.105)  (-0.057)
NOBS  25  23  24  24  25  24  25  17
48Table 6: Cointegrating  Vector for Savings Adjusting  for Domestic Capital  Gains
Part II: Dynamic GLS for (s  y),a = Ao+  /36  In ya + ,#2r, + /3 3fli,  + / 4;rt +  J 5govsa  + u,
CHL  GHA  IDN  KOR  MYS  MEX  TUR  ZWE
Constant  -2.202  -1.329  -2.205  -9.827  0.906  -0.728  2.461  -3.902
(-1.931)  (-2.751)  (-4.528)  (-3.145)  (1.330)  (-3.248)  (1.023)  (-1.243)
In !  0.178  0.135  0.197  0.473  -0.0(9  0.113  -0.162  0.684
(I 966)  (3.176)  (5.057)  (3.936)  (-0.836)  (3.947)  (-0.939)  (1.476)
0.045  -0.534  -0.834  -0.349  -1.143  0.004  -0.059  -3.724
(0.062)  (-1.505)  (-5.018)  (-1.517)  (-3.131)  (0.053)  (-0.751)  (-3.384)
.)008  0.006  (0.003)  (0.023)  0.016  (0.005)  0.025  0.277
(0.434)  (1.207)  (-0.805)  (-2.269)  (2.111)  (-1.822)  (3.221)  (3.199)
0.047  -0.606  -0.679  -0.385  -1.256  0.245  -0.180  -4.983
(0.585)  (-1.842)  (-3.628)  (-1.561)  (-3.503)  (4.648)  (-1.748)  (-3.456)
eovs,  -0.246  0.179  -2.003  -0.885  -0.685  -0.998  0.147  -1.777
(-0.699)  (0.323)  (-4.516)  (-2.182)  (-3.463)  (-6.241)  (0.336)  (-2.246)
NOBS  23  21  22  22  23  22  23  15
Notes:
1. t-statistics in parenthesis.
2. (s/v)at,  In yat,  govsat  have been adjusted for capital gains (losses) on nominally denominated domestic
assets due to inflation.
49Table 7: Excess  Sensitivity  Tests and the Augmented  Euler  Equation  for
Consumption  (GMM Estimates)
CHL  GHA  IDN  KOR  MYS  MEX  TUR  ZWE
A In  yt  0.550  1.705  1.606  0.359  1.185  0.687  0.575  1.088
(3.222)  (1.056)  (1.113)  (2.089)  (2.593)  (3.127)  (1.445)  (3.392)
r,  0.076  0.349  0.490  0.275  0.767  0.181  0.028  0.280
(2.464)  (-0.828)  (0.955)  (1.412)  (1.056)  (2.688)  (0.233)  (-0.837)
BG test  0.653  0.041  0.870  0.424  0.042  0.041  0.634  0.491
NOBS  24  24  23  23  24  24  24  19
Part 11
CHL  GHA  IDN  KOR  MYS  MEX  TUR  ZWE
a  -0.81  -7.566  -2.673  6.683  -0.136  4.811
(-2.914)  (-1.454)  (-0.462)  (0.30)  (-0.016)  (-3.411)
al  -0.109  0.272  -1.813  -1.42  0.701  0.731
(-0.735)  (0.90)  (-0.733)  (-0.591)  (0.49)  (2.36)
J.L  0.771  0.841  0.540  0.570  0.560  1.471
(2.668)  (2.241)  (91.844)  (18.943)  (2.791)  (34.736)
CY  -0.001  1.066  6.278  1.055  0.449  0.477
(-0.013)  (1.111)  (0.163)  (1.255)  (1.728)  (0.472)
OR  test  0.057  0.880  0.931  0.079  0.655  0.916
NOBS  24  23  23  24  24  24
Notes:
1. t-statistics  in parenthesis.
2. The instruments  used  are
3. BG denotes  the  marginal  significance  level  for the  Breusche-Godfrey  test for serial correlation  up
to the second  order.
503. OR denotes  the marginal  significance  level  of the test of over-identifying  restrictions.
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